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Abstract 
 
The theoretical and empirical weaknesses in the inequality-conflict arguments have stimulated scholars to seek better 
reasoning and approaches. Often, scholars had reported a spurious correlation between inequality and conflict because 
interaction is governed by an “invisible hand’, which produces ‘unintended consequences’. It has therefore been concluded that 
inequality does not directly affect conflict. Thus despite hopelessness and disenfranchisement, inequality or deprivation has not 
caused violence because of mediating factors, notably justification. The viability of various mediators has been of major interest 
to scholars of rebellion. This article takes a look at various explanations within the collective action literature, using Nigeria as 
an example. The review showed that explanations have transited from rationalizations to justification and from efficacy to 
attributions. It showed that the emergence of an urban citizenship with informed political agenda has the potential to challenge 
the state or influence politics to demand basic services. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Under neo-liberal globalization, world economies have grown. However, in many countries, income growth was 
accompanied by increased inequality (World Bank, 2007). In Nigeria, under the Structural Adjustment Programme(1980-
1996), GDP increased 40%; however, households in the top 30% income bracket appropriated 75% of all gains, while 
incomes attributed to the bottom 10% decreased by 30%. Gini coefficient increased 20% (UN-HABITAT, 2003). The 
immediate cause of poverty therefore, is not in lack of resources, but in inequality of income distribution. With a gross 
Domestic Product of $459.6 billion (World Bank, 2012), it is Sub-Saharan Africa’s biggest economy (current GDP 
estimated at $509.9 billion).  
 
2. Nigeria and the Oil Curse  
 
The discovery of oil in the 1960s transformed its economy from an agro-base to oil dependency. With an estimated oil 
reserve of 40 billion barrels, and currently the world’s 12th leading oil producer, it earns an estimated $20 billion from oil 
daily. 80% of government revenues and 50% of GDP is earned from oil (Watts, 2005). Nigeria’s oil fortunes have 
however been a nightmare; 85% of oil earnings accrue to 1% of the population (Watts, 2005). The nation’s erstwhile anti-
corruption chief, Nuhu Ribadu revealed that over $380 billion had been stole since 1960 (BBC, 2006). It is common 
knowledge that in the past decades, Transparency International rated Nigeria the most corrupt country in the world. 
Despite huge oil earnings, over 70% of Nigerians subsist on less than $1 a day (UNDP, 2004); 2/3 are described as 
critically poor. Ironically, this proportion increased when the country received higher oil revenues (Tomlinson, 2002). 
Years of economic mismanagement and large scale corruption have undermined the country’s development; poverty had 
grown from 27.2% in 1980 to 66% in 1996; an estimated 30 million people are ‘extremely poor’- unable to meet ‘basic 
food needs’ (Narayan & Petesch, 2002). With the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), most 
industries that hitherto served as sources of employment to the teeming populations had collapsed, leaving millions eking 
a living from informal sources of employment and slipping into poverty. Rather than cure poverty, oil revenue had 
deepened inequality with extremities of opulence and poverty flourishing side- by- side. While the rich are holed up in 
mansions, the poor are increasingly concentrated in slums; places characterized by insecurity of tenure, poor housing 
conditions, deficient access to safe drinking water, poor sanitation and severe overcrowding (UNFPA, 1996). 2/3 of 
Lagos, Nigeria’s financial capital is made up of slums and shanties (Davis, 2006). 
The level of poverty in the slums contrasts sharply with the lifestyle of the wealthy that live nearby and possibilities 
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of upward mobility for the poor and their children fade as educational and occupational openings diminish. Under this 
situation, frustrations from dashed expectations of a better life might be expected to lead to social tension, protests, and a 
‘class consciousnesses’ among the poor. While there have been violent protests in Nigeria, like the Agbekoya peasant 
uprising in the 1960s, the Bakolori riots, the Niger Delta (Egbesu Boys) and Boko Haram violent episodes, student 
demonstrations, mob actions and strikes over wages, taxes, and structural adjustment policies leading to violence, there 
has been an absence of demands for radical restructuring of society in a more egalitarian way; in Nigerian history there is 
no record of an uprising of the poor against the rich. While Nigeria has experienced a civil war and recently there has 
been growth of ethnic militias, the motivations of these groups are more often ethnic or religious (Ukiwo, 2005). Where 
violence had occurred they had been spontaneous and uncoordinated, directed against specific irksome conditions and 
quickly fade away upon achieving demands. While it may be argued that long years of military rule had repressed political 
freedom of Nigerians, return to civil rule has hardly changed the mismanagement of the economy and the nature of 
demands (Epelle and Uranta, 2014).  
Recent ‘happiness surveys’ reported that Nigerians are the happiest people in the world. It is curious that people 
who live with such levels of poverty and inequality in a country with so many resources could be described as happy. 
Hirschman (1973) argued that income and stratification inequality can be tolerated where there is a perception that 
mobility is possible for the talented and diligent, while the inept fall. Schureke (2003) also posited that in a ‘tunnel effect’, 
people will justify a system if they perceive that they have chances of upward mobility within it. While there have been 
studies of income inequality, living conditions, (Olanrewaju, 2001) conflicts, (Epelle and Uranta, 2014; Akubor, 2011; 
Alabi, 2007; Ukiwo, 2005) and structures of legitimacy (Osaghae, et al, 1998) in Nigeria, there has been no scientific 
study of how Nigerians perceive inequality and how rationalizations and attribution are related to legitimization of 
inequality. It has been argued that while attributions may not be the sole determinant of action, they are important 
determinants of judgments, decisions and behaviour (Heine & Montiel, 1999). Jost and Banaji (1994) argued that social 
systems are maintained in part through the attitudes and beliefs that support them, and that social arrangements are 
stable to the extent that they are perceived as legitimate. Our knowledge of beliefs about poverty and inequality is 
therefore central to our understanding of justification or challenge to the status quo, and policies to redress inequality 
(Bullock, 2006).  
 
3. Marginality and Consciousness 
 
This leads to the debate of the possible development of class consciousness among the urban poor in African societies. 
While the use of class to designate social categories in Africa has remained problematic (Lloyd, 1974), Miliband (cited in 
Lloyd, 1974) argued that the development of class consciousness must be preceded by a perception of membership, and 
of what the advancement of class interests require. While the poor in Nigeria can be said to be conscious of certain 
economic interests and differences in wealth and status, many concerns are expressed in terms of primordial, individual, 
religious or ethnic interests and similar vague ideological categories that diminish possibilities of the emergence of 
organizations that can provoke social change. Rather than an attitude of concern for the collective progress for the lower 
classes therefore, there is a preponderance of an individual desire to escape poverty through personal efforts (Portes and 
Walton, 1976). Blame for poverty is placed on circumstances or the individual rather than structure, thereby deflecting the 
revolutionary potential of frustration. 
 
3.1 The Paradox of Inequality and Seeming Stability 
 
Interests in the problems of inequality has been spawned by fears that large populations of unemployed persons, 
concentrated in urban centers next door to the rich and powerful would be the breeding ground for proponents of radical 
political ideologies (Perlman, 2004). From Aristotle and Plato to De Tocqueville, Marx, Dahl and in fact Huntington it has 
been thought that societies with more unequal income distributions are more prone to phenomena like revolutions, wars, 
coups, terrorism and rebellion (Lichbach, 1990). Marx had thought that by creating urban poverty, capitalism had 
provided the instrument for its own demise. Castells (1977) conceived of urban social movements as the foundation for 
class organizations of the urban poor. Former IMF Managing Director Michel Camdesus warned that ‘… poverty is the 
ultimate systemic threat facing humanity. The widening gaps between rich and poor nations … are … potentially socially 
explosive … If the poor are left hopeless, poverty will undermine societies through confrontation, violence and civil 
disorder’ (Camdesus, 2000). In fact commonsense suggests that with increased poverty, the poor will reject the status 
quo in favour of self-interested motivations, and that greater injustice will breed greater discontent (Henry & Saul, 2006), 
as advocated for example, by economic and rational choice models of political action (Fiorina, 1981), social identity 
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theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), relative depravation and frustration-aggression models (Gurr, 1970), and the realistic 
group conflict theory (Bobo, 1983). In summary therefore, it is assumed that the denial of basic freedoms or access to the 
basic essentials of life, will force people to choose between accepting gross injustice and securing a fairer share by 
violent means. It is almost a universal assumption that an inequitable distribution of resources and wealth will provoke 
violent rebellion (Cramer, 2005). However, history reveals far more acquiescence than identity-based competition or 
revolt on the part of disadvantaged group; rebellion is only an occasional reaction to suffering in human history (Zinn, 
1968).  
Contrary to speculations therefore, the urban poor have been found to be conservative, patriotic and system 
supportive (Perlman, 2004), preferring incremental changes to fundamental change. While urban movements have had 
some successes in influencing governments, successive governments have had successes in suppressing demands and 
excluding them from political participation despite worsened conditions, playing groups against each other, using what is 
now termed the ‘patron-client’ tactics (Davis, 2006). Where violence had erupted it had been the result of collective 
actions among competing groups (ethnic, regional or religious) mobilizing people around collective identities (Ukiwo, 
2005). Demanding for immediate consumption issues like land invasion or riots over food and fuel prices or desires for 
other items that guarantee a more stable and predictable structure of daily life, (Walton, 1997). The poor have thus rallied 
promiscuously between leftist and rightist governments depending whichever can provide immediate needs (Davis, 
2006), rather than taking practical actions to change the system. Economic inequality therefore incites relatively little 
protest; inequality does not directly affect conflict (Lichbach, 1990; Bullock, 2006). This for Cramer (2005), means ‘…that 
inequality is legitimized in one way or another; that the inequality comes with a degree of power and repression that are 
simply too great to overcome; or that there are various obstacles preventing collective action..’. The fairness or unfairness 
of inequality is therefore often determined by the effectiveness of national ideologies and institutions in justifying the 
system of inequality. Given that the inequality-conflict arguments are theoretically and empirically weak there is therefore 
a need for better reasoning and approaches (Lichbach, 1990). 
These questions continue to beg for answers. Davis (2006) quipped rhetorically; what then is responsible for the 
seeming legitimization of inequality that have made Marx’s ‘historical agency’ impotent? Or are the slums volcanoes 
waiting to erupt as Victorian bourgeoisies once imagined? Is there a point at which congestion, violence and poverty in 
the slums will overwhelm the ‘clientistic’ politics and ad hoc survival networks and lead to combustion? Lichbach (1990) 
argued that scholars had reported a spurious correlation between inequality and conflict because interaction is governed 
by an “invisible hand’, which produces ‘unintended consequences’. Inequality or deprivation has not caused violence 
because of mediating factors, notably ‘justification’ (Cramer, 2005); this justification may come from culture, political, 
economic and social processes, or some ‘ideological moments’. What social values therefore, allow the poor in the Third 
World to come to terms with inequality? How do status beliefs emerge that legitimizes the status order? (Hegtvedt, 2004) 
Scholars have been interested in the causes and consequences of poverty and beliefs about causes of poverty and 
inequality, especially with regards to the role of ideology and class consciousness in the maintenance and reproduction of 
social inequality (Hunt, 1996). Our knowledge of beliefs about inequality is therefore central to the understanding of public 
attitudes towards the status quo, and policies to redress inequality.  
 
3.2 The Concept of Marginality  
 
The use of the concept of urban marginality is the product of ethnographic studies of peasants’ adaptation to city life. 
These approaches have contended that migrant peasants found integration into ‘modern’ cities impossible because of 
their values, attitudes, traditions and behavioural patterns. The views of this school is summed up in Oscar Lewis’ (1969) 
theory of the culture of poverty, which proposes that the poor reject the values of the larger society, creating a different 
subculture, in which economic and social handicaps are self-reinforced, resulting in intergenerational deprivation. The use 
of marginality to describe the conditions of the urban poor declined giving way to new concepts like capacity deprivation 
(Sen, 1999) or livelihood and assets (Rakodi, 2001), which argue that poverty is not attributable to attitudinal deficiencies 
in the poor, but the underlying social structure. These approaches have been responsible for the formulation of policies 
that embrace hither-to disadvantaged groups like women, ethnic minorities and the disabled, and advocating the use of 
social and human capitals as panacea for survival and the entrenchment of the social welfare states to cater for the 
‘disadvantaged. With the triumph of or neoliberalism, the use of the term ‘advanced marginality’ gained currency. 
Wacquant (1999) theorized that new forms of global capitalism encompassing deindustrialization, and the growth of the 
knowledge economy, causes desolation, as highly skilled workers are rewarded and unskilled workers rendered jobless 
(Sassen, 1991) thus extant marginality based on residual poverty in working class communities hither-to assumed to be 
remediable by an expansion in the market as postulated by Marx and Engels has become permanent. Wacquant argued 
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that Marginality is decoupled from cyclical fluctuations of the economy as upswings have no benefits for the poor, while 
downswings imply greater misery. Further economic growth thus produces more marginality. Advanced marginality is 
enhanced by what Wacquant termed the ‘retrenchment of the welfare state’ entailing the stemming of social budgets and 
anti-poverty programmes and privatization of social policy. The concept of advanced marginality is closely linked to the 
development of the underclasses in many cities of developed nations.  
 
4. Explanations of Reaction to Marginalization and Deprivation in Nigeria  
 
Since independence, Nigeria has had some experience of armed conflicts (Akpan, 2007). These include the ‘Agbekoya’ 
uprising in the erstwhile Western region in the 1960s, the ‘Tiv’ riots and the secessionist bid by Isaac Boro in the Niger-
Delta region. While it may be argued that the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970) is the most costly episode of violence in 
Nigerian history, Olukoshi (1998: 16) argued that economic crisis which commenced in the 1980s consequent upon the 
adoption of SAP served to undermine state capacity and legitimacy reinforcing the structures of authoritarianism, and 
creating an endless spiral of crisis after crisis. While most of these episodes have been described as stemming from 
ethnic, regional and religious mobilization especially with recent formation of ethnic militias masquerading as freedom 
fighters, the recent crisis in the oil rich Niger-Delta region has perhaps had the greatest impact on the ability of the 
country to retain its territorial and economic integrity. Akpan (2007: 162) aptly described the situation in Nigeria’s Niger-
Delta when he asserted that the region Ĵ…has since the early 1990s witnessed an almost unbroken orgy of violence and 
militarization‘. Employing the Marxian political economy approach, Epelle and Uranta (2014) concluded that the recent 
Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria is reflection of the dependent and weak character of the Nigerian State. They 
hypothesised that Boko Haram is symptomatic of not only a weak state, but also a desperate and marginalized class 
whose only source of drawing the state’s attention is through organized violence. For Epelle and Uranta (2014) therefore, 
Boko Haram is merely a coincidence between serious private accumulation of the state’s GDP and lack of what they 
termed ‘Focused Civil Empowerment’. The Boko Haram scenario can be located within the capitalist mode of 
reproduction in which gropus dissatisfied with their condition under sundry identities (class, ethnic, and religious) to 
improve their position. Epelle and Uranta (2014) concluded that while identity factors may contribute to the violence, the 
nature and character of the Nigerian state is a major factor in the emergence of the deepening politico-religious violence 
in the northern part of the country, described as Boko Haram. Although the group is being allegedly sponsored by some 
northern politicians, ideologically, Boko Haram is opposes to western education, western culture and modern science. 
Official estimates indicate that since the general election in 1999, over 2,000 people have died in sectarian and ethnic 
violence (Singer, 2000). While most explanations of this situation have been within the ambits of ethnicity, class, 
clienticism as well as religious identities, there have been limited attempts to utilize a relative deprivation perspective.  
 
4.1 Legitimization of Inequality: Injustice Perception and the Rational Actor 
 
The legitimacy of a system of stratification must come from rationalization by both those who benefit from it and those 
who do not otherwise members of both groups are likely to foment social change (Olson & Hafer, 2001). While it is clear 
why beneficiaries of a system come to support it, scholars have tried to grapple with how people legitimize a system in 
which they are disadvantaged. Recently, Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999) Self 
Evaluation (Della Fave, 1980) and Social Justice Theories (Hegtvedt, 2004) have been used to explain how 
disadvantaged persons respond to inequality. While the SDO argues that the degree to which a person endorses anti-
egalitarian views and group-based inequality determines their level of legitimization of inequality, Self-evaluation theories 
posit that people’s evaluations about their ability to obtain resources lead to a normative acceptance of inequality, when 
self-evaluations become congruent with resource received (Sutphin, 2007). Social Justice Theories however argue that 
justice exists when there is congruence between expectations and outcomes (of rewards and procedures for determining 
rewards) based on normative rules and that perception of injustice leads to emotional distress and attempts to restore 
justice. These theories paint a picture of advantaged persons as cashing in on their dominance and the disadvantaged as 
revolutionaries-in-waiting and conflicts of interest are assumed to be endemic (Jost & Banaji, 1994). The system 
justification perspective on the contrary, proposes a positive correlation between group disadvantage and support for the 
status quo (Henry & Saul, 2006); it argues that “…existing social arrangements are legitimized, even at the expense of 
personal and group interest” so long as it is perceived as fair and legitimate (Jost & Banaji, 1994), and that dominant and 
subordinate groups are averse to conflict and antagonism and generally develop collaborative relationships.  
With extremes of wealth and poverty in capitalist society, justifications must be created to rationalize inequality. 
These justifications provide answers to the disadvantaged who may become aggrieved when wealth gaps become 
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excessive and unfair (Huber & Form, 1973). An illusion is created of a fair economic and social structure, making it seem 
normal, fair, necessary, inevitable, moral and therefore legitimate. Stereotypes, myths, and ideologies become tools to 
make the poor, as well as the rich, believe that they ‘deserve’ their places in the stratification spectrum thereby 
perpetuating inequality. Characteristic elements of this concept are the principle of equal opportunities and the 
responsibility of each person for his/her social position. (Castillo, 2007) Disadvantaged classes come to believe that 
existing rules governing the allocation of rewards, power and distribution of wealth and incomes also represent their 
interests and are therefore legitimate. In the social justice, and social conflict literature, increasing concern is being given 
to individual subjective perceptions of fairness or unfairness of the redistribution system (Hedgvelt, 2004). The central 
idea is that individual subjective perceptions rather than the ‘objective perceptions of an external observer, has a greater 
effect on attitudes and actions and that more often, when there is an incongruence between expectations and rewards 
based on normative rules, emotional distress ensues that provokes attempts to restore justice( Hedgvldt, 2004). The 
system justification perspective on the contrary however, hypothesized that disadvantage people are more likely to justify 
existing social systems, and that ‘‘system justification levels will be higher in societies in which social and economic 
inequality is more extreme than less extreme’’(Jost & Banaji, 1994). It contends that economic inequality does not present 
a threat to the legitimacy of the social order since the order is a collaborative psychological and ideological process where 
inequality is justified by virtually everyone in society, especially the more disadvantage and not merely as something 
imposed by one group on another. Disadvantaged people thus come to believe that existing rules governing the 
allocation of rewards, power and distribution of wealth and incomes also represent their interests and are therefore 
legitimate Jost and (2003). This legitimization is achieved through stereotypes and other ideological devices (Jost & 
Banaji, 1994) that neutralize the effects of discontent, replacing it with out group favouritism and attitudinal ambivalence. 
While all perspectives have found empirical support for each position, they leave a confusion regarding the true nature of 
reactions of the disadvantaged to perceived inequality. This has been largely due to the fact that researchers had focused 
on feelings and attitudes largely neglecting actual resultant actions (Wright et al, 1990). 
 
4.2 Poverty Attributions 
 
Scholars have been interested in beliefs about causes of poverty and inequality, especially with regards to the role of 
ideology and class consciousness in the maintenance and reproduction of social inequality (Hunt, 1996). Studies linking 
poverty attribution to inequality legitimization correlate legitimization to the acceptance of an ‘ideology of individualism’ 
(Feagin, 1975) or a ‘logic of opportunity syllogism’ (Kluegel & Smith, 1986), linked to Americans’ acceptance of a system 
of inequality based on a preponderant belief that poverty is the result of individual character deficiency (Robinson, 2009). 
In what is now regarded as a classic study of perceptions of causes of poverty, Feagin, (1972) advanced three categories 
of attributions of poverty: Individualistic explanations, structural explanations and fatalism. While Feagin’s attribution index 
was tested on Americans, his study has been replicated using other samples, Feagin’s work has formed the basis for 
current studies regarding attributions of poverty.  
Studies of attributions of poverty have been very useful in determining perceptions of causality, predisposition and 
actions, and are therefore useful for policies of poverty removal (Ige and Nekhwevha, 2012). Hunt (1996) argued that 
contrary to explanations that ideologies exist in opposing individualist-rightist against structural-leftist perspectives, 
individual and structural explanations are often combined in cases where individuals perceive that while structural barriers 
cause poverty, if people work hard enough they can overcome it, in which case contradictory beliefs are combined in 
compromise explanations (Robinson, 2009). This seeming values inconsistency (‘split consciousnesses’) is the basis for 
social cohesion; a lack of consensus on system challenging values among the poor and excluded is the source of social 
stability (Mann, 1970). The split consciousness thesis proposes that the dominant ideology (individualism) and the 
challenging ideology (structuralism) coexist without conflict; both norms jointly occupy different "segments" of an 
individual's consciousness. 
 
4.2.1 Attributions and Legitimization 
 
Studies have shown how disadvantaged and advantaged persons or groups come to accept ‘legitimizing myths’ 
‘Legitimizing Ideology’ or what Robinson (2009) termed ‘institutional logic’, reminiscent of Marx’s ‘false consciousness’, 
embedded in ‘beliefs in a just world ‘or forms of meritocracy, legitimizing status differences (Henry and Saul, 2006). 
Feagin (1972) had found that nationally, Americans believe in a ‘meritocratic’ philosophy and that this formed the basis 
for unbridled individualism. Feagin’s finding which reflects the so-called American dream has been found by virtually all 
studies on American attitudes to poverty (Kluegel & Smith, 1986). Hunt (1996) however showed that individualistic 
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philosophies are not all encompassing; Americans differ in attitudes according to race and geographical locations. 
Robinson (2009) demonstrated how American beliefs could be understood on the basis of an individualist-structural 
continuum on which attributions and legitimization could be located. In studies of transitory economies of Western 
Europe, a similar pattern is emerging as people’s acceptance of egalitarian distribution gives way for individualism as an 
overriding ideology. 
 
4.3 Class and Ethnicity Paradigms  
 
The colonial state bequeathed to Nigeria at independence towers above all other structures of society, retaining for itself 
absolute control of massive economic resources (Idowu, 1999). As the state is the custodian of political power needed for 
accumulation, (Ekekwe, 1985: 53) it then becomes the central actor in the formation and mediation of conflicts. While it 
has been argued that internal marginalization is the cause of conflict between economic and social groupings in Nigeria 
(Adedeji, 1999: 32), Nolutshungy (1996: 2) averred that the state is central to the process of marginalization. Alavi (1972) 
argued that at independence, post-colonial states in Africa inherited a bureaucratic-military apparatus that was 
overdeveloped in relation to the society because of the necessity to maintain the subordinate status of the latter to 
colonial interests. The state thus appropriates economic surplus in the name of development, fostering territorial unity and 
legitimacy (Idowu, 1999). Ake (1985: 43-65) argued that class struggles consequent upon attempts to hijack the state and 
the consumerist character of the dominant classes are the precursors for instability in Nigeria, thus proposing that class 
politics is central to Nigeria’s problems. Ake (1996: 42) contends further that ‘instead of being a public force, the state in 
Africa tends to be privatized, that is, appropriated to the service of private interests by the dominant faction of the elite’. In 
the same vein, Onimode (1988: 97-125) averred that class struggle stimulates conflicts in Nigeria and is central to an 
understanding of socio-economic inequality. Nigeria, for Onimode is therefore polarized between the political power 
holders on one hand and working people on the other, resulting in an intra- class and inter-class struggle between 
bourgeoisie and working class ideologies. However, the view of the Nigerian situation as amenable to a class analysis 
has been contended. Idowu (1999: 43) argued that given the heterogeneous ethnic environment in which these ‘classes’ 
have had to engage in struggle, and the fact that ethnic identities tend to be stronger than class identities, an analysis of 
the Nigerian situation using a ‘class ‘prism produces a jaundiced picture. In a failed state like Nigeria, which sustains 
ethnic parochialism, institutions ultimately collapse and anarchy eventually ensues as ethnic groups contend for power 
making ethnicity a superior paradigm for explaining contentions. Idowu (1999: 44) therefore argued that ethnicity 
transcends other loyalties to become the sole basis of identity. Studies have unveiled a number of mobilization on the 
basis of religious and ethnic rather than class identities as the precursor for needless violence and wars in Africa (Idowu, 
1999; Ukiwo, 2005). Mobilization on the basis of ethnicity has been used to garner solidarity for in-groups and negative 
bias and hostility towards out-groups to stimulate conflicts in Africa. Therefore, Ukiwo (2005: 4) argued that competition 
for political power and resources in Nigeria is based rather on ethnic than class identities. This ethnicity manifests in a 
variety of forms, including voting and political party support, community service and violence.  
Instrumentalist conceptions of ethnicity argue that ambitious classes and regional elites manipulate ethnic identities 
to suit class interests, thereby politicizing it in its quest for state power and wealth (Varshney, 2002). The implication of 
this argument is that ordinarily people do not engage in conflicts except at the behest of the elites. Ukiwo (2005) therefore 
averred that there is the tendency to exonerate the agency of the subordinate classes in privileging the role of the 
bourgeois and petty-bourgeois classes The common feature of such arguments is the centrality of the state and 
conspiratorial bourgeois elements in fostering violence to suit their goals, a trend that has been reported in studies of 
conflicts elsewhere in Africa (Mandami, 2001). This instrumentalist assumption which pervades the literature however 
fails to demonstrate how congruence emerges between the interests of the ethnic leaders and those of their followers 
(Ukiwo, 2005). This would require an investigation of the nature of horizontal inequalities among ethnic groups and the 
responses of groups to such inequalities. The successes of the elites in their instrumental manipulations have been 
adduced to an array of factors, one of which revolves around the reciprocal obligations consequent upon ‘clieticism’.  
 
4.4 Reciprocal Obligations and ‘Clienticism’  
 
The patron-client model of co-optation (Nelson, 1979: 383) avers that the urban poor in Third World cities are basically 
satisfied with urban life and are too preoccupied with trying to make ends meet to engage in protests and eventually 
become petitioners in the demand ‘making process’ (Walton, 1997: 2) political participation therefore often takes the form 
of deference and patronage. Thus while the elite grab the lion’s share of privileges, the poor are co-opted with minor 
concessions like subsidized services. This perspective however presents the poor as rational actors who make the best 
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of their circumstances rather than gullible subjects of manipulation (Walton, 1997: 3). In fact Leeds & Leeds (1976, 
quoted in Walton, 1997: 4) argued that the poor themselves manipulate the system as much as they are manipulated by 
it. Therefore, clientistic participation often entails material gains in addition to the concessions. Patronage has thus 
become the only means by which people can succeed in Nigeria (Smith, 2001). In the African tradition, morality rooted in 
kinship demands reciprocal obligations of patrons to clients (Smith, 2001: 593). Whilst kin-based societies are marked by 
inequality, this inequality is sustained when people at the top echelon of society consistently fulfil certain obligations to the 
downtrodden to buy loyalty, prestige and power (Bledsoe, 1995). In this way everyone is a client or a patron depending 
on his/her place in the social hierarchy. The advantaged therefore benefit more when they acquire large numbers of 
clients than fortunes, a resource that is easily cashed in (Guyer, 1995). Thus in Nigeria today, connections with patrons 
with state and economic power determines one’s access to jobs, health care, education and other services. Within this 
framework, tension and conflicts arise only when clients perceive that their patrons are not doing enough. Where the 
patrons feel less obliged to fulfil their obligations, as occurred with military regimes in Nigeria, their clients are left without 
leverage. A system of stratification that puts the haves in obligation to the have-nots is therefore more desirable. Smith 
(2001: 596) hypothesized that Nigerians’ hatred for their erstwhile military rulers was rooted in the failure of the latter to 
fulfil client-patron obligations rather than corruption or ineptitude. As Smith (2001: 603) noted, not distributing ill-gotten 
wealth to clients and supporters is regarded as a form of evil which must be opposed. Diminished client-patron benefits 
consequent upon long years of military rule heightened deprivation and inequalities leading to deepened resentments. 
Clienticism is however inextricably intertwined with beliefs in the supernatural selection of those who acquire elite status.  
 
4.5 The Political Economy of Religion and Pentecostalism in Nigeria  
 
Davis (2006) proposed that while urbanization and urban poverty in developed nations had secularized the masses as 
predicted by Marx, by contrast, in the developing world, the reverse had been the case (McLeod, 1996). In the cities of 
developing nations, Davis (2006: 28) asserts, ‘Marx had yielded to Mohammed and the Holy Ghost‘. This reinforces the 
underlying importance of religious beliefs in shaping perceptions and reactions to social issues among people of 
developing nations. Perlman (1976) in her study of the Brazilian favelados noted that a majority of her sample reported 
that they believed that success in life is attributable to some ‘unseen spirits’ Religion and fatalism may thus be a factor 
stimulating ‘dual consciousness’, a perception of structural forces as causes of marginalization and deprivation and an 
unwillingness to ‘do something’ about it. 
Recently, Pentecostal Christianity has expanded along with increasing poverty and desolation in Nigeria (Smith, 
2001). Scholars have linked the proliferation of the belief in unseen forces in Africa to the intrusion of colonial capitalism 
as well as neoliberal globalization and its attendant neoliberal policies (Smith, 2001). As capitalism produces extreme 
wealth and poverty existing side by side, a process which is beyond the comprehension of ordinary people, and often 
brings confusion, the belief in unseen forces and witchcraft distil these complex processes into comprehensible motives 
(Comaroff & Comaroff, 1999: 284). Consequently, rather than project frustration towards the state and capitalist, 
discontent is projected back to the unseen symbols of traditional social structure that people conceive as inhibiting their 
personal acquisition of wealth, whilst working in favour of a privileged few. The popularity of Pentecostalism is therefore 
adduced to the need for a moral compass to navigate the strains and despair that accompany recent economic 
misfortunes. Smith (2001: 588) argued that forces responsible for inequality in Nigeria are conceptualized and interpreted 
as social, political, economic as well as supernatural. Failures and success of people are attributed to unseen forces. This 
assertion is consistent with many ethnographic and Anthropological findings that the distribution of wealth and power are 
explained through the prism of the supernatural (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1999). Studies have shown that wealth and power 
is explained by African in terms of witchcraft and the occult thus response to deprivation poverty and inequality is often 
linked with consultations with positive occult powers to seek protection or reverse curses.  
The growth of Pentecostal Christianity in Nigeria has been adduced to its perceived ability to counter the evil 
effects of witchcraft in consigning people to poverty (Smith, 2001). These churches have therefore been at the forefront of 
reinforcing local beliefs that the emergence of ‘fast wealth is attributable to satanic force. The churches situate all battles 
including poverty and frustration within the general battle between good and evil or God and the Devil. Marshall (1993: 
34) proposed that connections are made between the world of ‘satanic agents’ and martial power as people believe that 
‘big men’ acquire wealth and power through evil forces. Where subordinate classes are unable to express discontent 
within the ambit of the state, they often make accusations of witchcraft. Smith (2001: 588) posited that while the churches 
ostensibly condemned occult practices, they were in fact implicated in pre- conversion practices akin to the occult (Meyer, 
1995), and glaringly display knowledge that connote ambivalence (Marshall, 1993). The churches are also said to be 
complicit in that they promise adherents prosperity and wealth with God’s blessings thus the ‘religious entrepreneurs’ tout 
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their wealth as evidence that being ‘born again’ results in prosperity. Many are reported to own private jets, but some are 
suspicious of this sudden wealth (Smith, 2001). Consequently ‘born again’ churches have been on the rise in Nigeria with 
motives of converts often liked to political and economic aspirations. In reaction to the growing popularity of prosperity 
churches, scholars have found that other denominations that preached the frugal lifestyle have begun to modify their 
doctrine by jettisoning renunciation of material acquisition in favour of prosperity (Marshal-Fratani, 1998). Therefore while 
the churches preach against political patronage, corruption and nepotism in the national polity, they create their own 
networks of social patronage in this way presenting an alternative milieu for people to re-negotiating perceptions of 
economic frustration and social exclusion (Smith, 2001). Perhaps, this is the reason Pentecostalism has been more 
acceptable to the younger and more deprived who are in dire need of avenues to make sense of an increasingly 
frustrated life in a country that makes no attempt to provide for its people. Pentecostalism therefore offers a network of 
social ties to survive (Marshall-Fratani, 1998) as well as reinforcing a belief that God will reward true believers. The only 
kind of radical restructuring imagined is thus one in which being ‘born again’ will be the only criteria for success in Nigeria. 
Pentecostal Christianity in Nigeria therefore paradoxically preaches morality by condemning corruption and nepotism but 
in the same breath provides justification for individual ambition and accumulation of wealth.  
 
4.6 Relative Deprivation and Social Identity Inspired Explanations 
 
Greater injustice will breed greater discontent. This has been the arguments of most theories and theorists concerned 
with inequality and injustice (Lichbach, 1990). Most renown in this tradition are relative deprivation theory (Gurr, 1970), 
equity theory (Walster et al, 1978), social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), frustration-aggression model (Hepworth 
& West, 1988), self-evaluation theory (Della Fave, 1980) and distributive social justice theory (Hegtvedt & Markosky, 
1995). In summary, these theories argue, inequitable resource distribution produces emotional distress in the aggrieved 
and forces people to secure a fairer share by violent means (Cramer, 2005). Gurr (1970: 73) argued that; Ĵ…the more 
widespread and intense deprivation is among members of a population, the greater is the magnitude of strife‘. Scholars 
agree that deprivation emanates when a discrepancy exists between what people get and what they believe they ought to 
get (Gurr, 1970; Walster et al., 1978) that justice exists when there is congruence between expectations and outcomes, 
and that perception of injustice leads to emotional distress and often, attempts to restore justice. Della Fave (1980) put 
the argument succinctly, proposing that justice exists when there is congruence between expectations and outcomes 
based on normative rules, and that perception of injustice leads to emotional distress and attempts to restore justice.  
However, while it is reasonable to expect that absence of feelings of dissatisfaction may lead to inaction, the 
presence of these feelings does not necessarily lead to action (Martin, 1986: 238). In fact, the system justification theory 
hypothesizes that disadvantage people are more likely to justify existing social systems (Jost & Hunyadi, 2003). While 
Scholars are in agreement that perceptions of injustice leads to anger and emotional distress which actors may attempt to 
remove by attempting to restore justice (Hegtvedt, 2004), the relationship between discontent and strife (Gurr, 1970) or 
‘injustice feelings’ and ‘reactions to inequality’ has remained a trouble spot in the literature (Wright et al., 1990: 995). 
Scholars have thus attempted to answer the question; ‘what factors mediate emotional response to inequality and 
resultant actions’? (Hegtvedt, 2004) Scholarly resolution of this paradox has been guided by Olsen’s (1968) dilemma of 
collective action which proposes that rational individuals will take a ‘free ride’ where benefits of collective action accrue to 
all irrespective of level of participation. While Olsen’s proposal seemed to answer the question relating to why people do 
not participate in collective action, it does not explain why some people do (Klandermans, 2002). Gurr (1970) however 
posited that the discontent-strife relationship is mediated by the extent of the coercive potential of the state, 
institutionalization, social facilitation and legitimacy. Zelditch & Walker (1984) confirmed that collective support for an 
allocator (legitimacy) alters perception of unfairness and diminishes possibilities of action. Hegtvedt, Clay-Warner, & 
Johnson (2003) showed that reaction to injustice is contingent upon perception of fairness of distributive procedures and 
a comparison of one’s justice judgment with others.  
Results from Relative Deprivation (RD) and distributive justice theories however showed limitations in their 
applicability given difficulties in conceptualization of individual and collective feelings of deprivation (Kawakami & Dion, 
1995). Resource Mobilization (RM) approaches (McCarty & Zald, 1997) attempted to fill this gap by showing that action 
would ensue only when structural conditions are rife and resources for mobilization (weapons, money etc.) are available, 
regardless of ideology or feelings of injustice. While RM arguments were stunningly supported by the much quoted work 
of Ellemers, Wilke & van Knippenberg (1993) which cast doubts on the validity of feelings as antecedents of action, later 
works of Mummendey, Kessler, Klink & Mielke (1999) showed that when RD and Social Identity Theory (SIT) are 
combined, clearer paths from feelings to action could be discerned. Recently therefore, the infusion of SIT into RD 
research has led to the development of pathways for explaining motivations and impediments to action in terms of a 
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combination of instrumental and affective routes to action. It has thus been found that the extent of ‘group identification’ 
(Klandermans, 2002; van Zomeren et al., 2010) and perception of group ‘efficacy’ or ‘empowerment’ (Hornsey et al., 
2006; Giguere & Lalonde, 2010) mediate willingness to engage in collective action and actual action. Stürmer & Sturmer 
(2009) recently motivated for an addition pathway, ‘emotion’. Other Scholars have argued for supplementary pathways 
including willingness to express one’s view or ideology, the protection of sacred values (Ginges & Altran, 2009; van 
Stekelenburg et al., 2009) and individual enhancement motive (Tropp & Brown, 2004).  
Bluic et al (2007: 19) showed that while group identification and efficacy influence collective action, the statistical 
variance contributed to action by these variables have been weak, indicating that there are other mediating factors 
meriting attention beside these instrumental concerns. These studies have therefore not generated effective conclusions 
about the discontent-strife relationship thus the ‘trouble-spot’ persists in the literature rendering virtually all theoretical 
explanations incomplete. There is however, a notable exemption in the literature of an analysis of the effects of 
consensually shared beliefs and social structure in producing and sustaining inequality (Kluegel & Smith, 1986). The only 
notable exceptions to this have been Castillo (2007) and Martin (1986) who studied the effects of existential and utopian 
justice beliefs (egalitarianism and in-egalitarianism) on reaction to injustice excluding an analysis of the mediating effect 
of beliefs that govern the realities of daily life like beliefs about causes of poverty. The social movement literature has 
downplayed the role of attitudes and beliefs as motivators or impediments to mobilization to redress grievances. 
However, matters of attitudes and beliefs are creeping back in the forms of logics, frames and discourse that spur micro-
mobilization (Rothenberg et al., 2002). 
 
5. The Relative Deprivation Explanation of Nigerian Conflicts 
 
Agbu (2007: 13) argued that with increasing deprivation and desolation consequent upon neoliberal economic 
globalization, vast proportions of Nigerian urban dwellers were rendered unemployed and ‘anomic’. These segments of 
the population therefore become a ready base for recruitment as criminals, ‘area boys and girls and members of ethnic 
militias. Anifowoshe (2000: 5) used relative deprivation theory and the frustration-aggression nexus to explain the 
emergence of ethnic militias in Nigeria. He argued that the origin of these militias is attributable to frustrated expectations 
consequent upon the nation’s economic demise. In his word; ‘mass misgivings over perceived political marginalization, 
poverty and unemployment, collapse of social infrastructure and state welfare programmes as well as the perceived 
inefficient and corrupt state security system‘. As the declining economic climate created acute discontent and frustration 
among the people, military rule repressed people’s reactions. However, the advent of democracy was accompanied by 
euphoria of expectations of increased political and economic freedom. Consequently, frustration consequent upon the 
failure of the new democratic government to provide the much taunted ‘dividends of democracy’ gave rise to violence 
(Anifowoshe, 2000: 6). The relative deprivation explanation has however not received as much acceptance as 
explanations based on class and ethnicity.  
 
6. Conclusion: Summative Conceptual Alignment  
 
The phenomenon of different reaction by people to inequality and deprivation in society has also interested recent 
scholars (Szirmai, 1991: 232). Olsen’s (1968) ‘dilemma of protest’ and its consequence of ‘free ride’ for rational actors 
probably partly answer the questions relating to rational inhibitions to protests. However, scholars in the Resource 
Mobilization tradition have shown that rational and instrumental concerns encompassing permissiveness of structural and 
political processes as well as cost benefit analysis preceded reaction (McCathy & Zald, 1977; Beaton & Deveau, 2005; 
Klandermans, 2002). The instrumental analysis extends to current debates within the Social Identity paradigm regarding 
the effects of perception of efficacy or empowerment as motivators of collective responses to injustice (Hornsey et al., 
2006; Giguère & Lalonde, 2010; Drury & Reitcher, 2005; van Zomeren et al., 2010). Perhaps the most prominent 
contributions to the debate have been within the ambit of the role of group identification as precursor to action with the 
argument that group members will respond to defend group interests where threatened (Klandermans, 2002), as well as 
individual enhancement motive in motivating group identity and action (Tropp & Brown, 2004). Recently however, van 
Zomeren et al., (2010) showed that efficacy and group identification are mutually enhancing and recursive. There have 
also been analyses of effects of emotion (Stürmer, & Simon, 2009), and violated sacred values and ideology (Giguère & 
Altran, 2009; van Stekelenburg et al., 2009). However the absence of the analysis of the effects of consensually shared 
beliefs about the causes of phenomena in shaping action (Kluegel & Smith, 1986) renders the account of motivators and 
constrains incomplete. The social movement literature has virtually downplayed the role of attitudes and beliefs as 
motivators or impediments to micro-mobilization for redressing grievances. However, matters of attitude are creeping 
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back in the forms of logics, frames and discourse that spur micro-mobilization (Rothenberg et al., 2008).  
The Relative Deprivation originally proposed by Stouffer et al., (1949) argued that social outcomes are predicated 
upon subjective rather that objective experiences. This proposition was further developed by Gurr (1970). There have 
however been debates about whether resultant action will be individual or collective depending upon whether subjective 
feelings are egoistic of fraternal or combined. Given ambiguities in findings of empirical RD studies (Ellemers et al. 1993) 
and the proposition that feelings were not relevant in determining reactions as advocated by RM studies (McCarthy & 
Zald, 1977; Brush, 1996), it took the infusion of SIT and later Taylor and McKirnan’s (1986) Five Stage Model of 
intergroup relations (FSM) to provide evidence that feelings would translate to action when legitimacy of intergroup 
structures were perceived illegitimate and group boundaries closed (Mummendey et al., 1999; Wright et al., 1990). 
However, the failure of SIT to predict which group members would embark on collective action led to the development of 
an integrative perspective culminating in FSM’s proposal that changes in perception of social philosophy guiding 
stratification and income distribution determines type and nature of resultant action (Taylor & Mckirnan, 1984). While 
FSM- inspired studies have theorized action to be the result of perception of group openness and legitimacy, there is little 
attention to FSM’s proposition that the true determinant of action is the change in the social philosophy guiding 
stratification even if perception of openness of group boundaries can be therein deduced. However, while scholars agree 
with the basic argument of RD that deprivation often stimulates feelings of injustice, Martin (1986) argued that often 
feelings have not led to action. Scholars have therefore been interested in studying what factors motivate or hinder 
reaction to injustice. While many, using the paradigm proposed by SIT, have identified instrumental and affective 
pathways to action, there have been arguments for the inclusion of separate pathways of emotions (Stürmer & Simon, 
2009), individual self enhancement (Tropp & Brown, 2004) as well the protection of sacred values (Ginges & Altran, 
2009). Bluic et al‘s (2007) argument that the statistical variance contributed to action by these variables justifies the 
search for non-instrumental antecedents accounting for missing variance in action (Ginges & Altran, 2009; van 
Stekelenburg et al., 2009).  
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